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Academic awareness of and interest in se-
curity policy has markedly increased in re-
cent years. Partially, this is the result of the
United States being thrust into a position of
world leadership, where it has been forced
as never before to rely on military tech-
niques. The revolutionary developments in
military technology have been an equally
important stimulus. Anything that accounted
for roughly two-thirds of the federal budget,
as military matters now do, would be cer-
tain to attract academic attention. The vast-
ly increased destructive power and speed of
new weapons made military questions even
more important and their examination by
scholars more urgent. Had the only ques-
tion been that of adjusting American think-
ing to the United States new military re-
sponsibilities, the task of scholarship would
not have been exceedingly dificult. Even
though American scholars rarely considered
security policy prior to the conclusion of the
second World War, with the literature from
other states there were ample sources, and
a number of concepts were well established.
However, the actual situation has been in-
finitely more complex; developments in
weapons technology have cast doubt on all
earlier concepts, some may continue to be
relevant, but all are in question until the
contrary is proved. The task of scholarship
in the field of security policy has been im-
mense. The challenge has produced a volu-
minous literature, some imaginative and
creative thought, and the beginnings of new
doctrines for the employment of military
techniques in world politics when and if
necessary. This review attempts critically to
evaluate some of the most prominent works
in this burgeoning literature, to consider
their policy impact (or lack thereof), and to
suggest areas where further research might
prove fruitful.
II
For analysis the seven books reviewed
may be divided into four categories. Two,
Henry Kissinger’s Nuclear Weapon and
Foreign Policy (6) and Robert Osgood’s
Limited War (7), are in a sense narrow in
focus and purpose. Both books urge that
Americans develop more diversified and so-
phisticated ideas concerning the use of
force, arguing particularly for acceptance of
the concept of limited war. Kissinger starts
with the assumption that, for the present,
renunciation of the use of force would
&dquo;place the international order at the mercy
of its most ruthless or its most irresponsible
1 The author is the World Affairs Center Fel-
low for 1959-60 and is on leave of absence
from his regular position.
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member&dquo; (pp. 4-5). If the United States
were to renounce or greatly inhibit its abil-
ity to use force, in his view, a vacuum would
be created into which the Soviet Union
would move with impunity. The problem in
the nuclear age is to find a method of em-
ploying force which does not involve intol-
erable destruction. Kissinger argues that
traditional American strategic doctrine, dom-
inated, he feels, by the concept of all-out
war, is inappropriate because of the nuclear
holocaust it would invoke. He argues that a
concept of limited nuclear war would be
more appropriate for all but the gravest
crises. His book is forcefully written; it has
been widely read and has rightly gained
great acclaim.
Mr. Osgood’s Limited War, although it
makes greater use of historical material, has
the same policy orientation, raises virtually
identical questions, and suggests a roughly
similar answer-the concept of limited war.
Osgood shows greater awareness of the mili-
tary, psychological, and other problems in-
volved in the tactical use of nuclear weap-
ons, but he nevertheless concludes that they
should be so used (pp. 251 ff. ) . His book
contains a deeper analysis of American atti-
tudes toward war (chap. ii) and, perhaps
for this reason, is less optimistic about the
willingness of Americans to adopt the rec-
ommended strategy. Kissinger and Osgood
both think that war can remain limited in
scope and technique only if the objectives
pursued are limited and narrowly defined,
and both men are strongly influenced by
their perception of war in the eighteenth
and nineteenth centuries and of the Korean
War. Each book contains an analysis of the
logical implications of limited war and an
attempt to apply these to the United States
global policies.
American Military Policy (3) by Edgar S.
Fumiss, Jr., and Military Policy and Nation-
al Security (5) by William W. Kaufmann
are alike in their broad orientation and in
being anthologies. Both books cover most
phases of security policy from economic mo-
bilization and civil defense to coalition strat-
egy. The former, designed for text use, is
the more complete, although this necessi-
tated the inclusion of some less than top-
quality selections. This volume’s greatest
contribution is making readily available
some of the most important articles of the
past decade in this field. Bernard Brodie’s
&dquo;Strategy as a Science&dquo; remains one of the
best statements of the need for scholarly
analysis of security policy; it should be the
starting point for all students in this field.
Robert Cutler’s description of the National
Security Council, Carl Kaysen’s analysis of
the United States vulnerability to enemy
attack, Clark W. Tinch’s study of the quasi-
war between Japan and the U.S.S.R. from
1937 through 1939, and Rear Admiral Sir
Anthony W. Buzzard’s plea for a policy of
graduated deterrence are all articles of last-
ing importance which should be widely
read. There is also much to be gained from
reading the late John Foster Dulles’ &dquo;mas-
sive retaliation&dquo; speech which is reprinted
in Mr. Furniss’ book. Present United States
defense policies still in large measure follow
the pattern Mr. Dulles articulated, the de-
fense budget still giving primary emphasis
to high-yield nuclear weapons.
Military Policy and National Security con-
tains eight essays, and, though somewhat
uneven, all are provocative. The essays have
unity as all attempt to explore the implica-
tions of nuclear weapons for international
affairs. Mr. Kaufmann’s own essays on de-
terence and limited war are among the best
analyses of these topics. The first of these
explores the logical implications of Dulles’
speech and the policy advocated therein. In
Kaufmann’s view, if the threat of &dquo;massive
retaliation&dquo; is to provide a credible deter-
rent to aggressive enemy action, it must be
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reserved for the most serious contingencies,
those in which we would truly be willing to
incur the risks involved in carrying it out,
and not used in every instance, as Dulles
appeared to imply (pp. 26 ff . ) . He advo-
cates, in his second essay, meeting other
menaces to American security interests with
limited war. Kaufmann forthrightly points
out the economic and other costs involved
in developing the necessarily diversified ca-
pabilities this doctrine demands, and he also
bluntly states that &dquo;limited war cannot be a
means of bringing about a radical alteration
in the distribution of power&dquo; (p. 127).
Throughout this volume there is a sense of
the tentativeness of our knowledge about the
meaning of nuclear weapons and the future
course of war-Klaus Knorr particularly em-
phasizes this in his essay on war potential-
and, if there is a general theme, it is that
because of this tentativeness the United
States should pursue broadly based and
flexible security policies.
Assumptions about the Soviet Union, its
military policies, and future actions are cru-
cial for any analysis in this field. The previ-
ously mentioned works deal with these
questions either implicitly (Furniss and
Kaufmann) or explicitly in separate sections
, (Kissinger and Osgood). In addition, two
books, Raymond L. Garthoff’s Soviet Strat-
egy in the Nuclear Age (4) and Herbert S.
Dinerstein’s War and the Soviet Union (2),
are exclusively devoted to such problems.
Of the two, Mr. Garthoff’s is broader; it de-
scribes how Soviet officers are involved in
the governmental structure and process and
the nature and composition of Soviet mili-
tary forces. It also analyzes the recent evo-
lution of Soviet strategic doctrine. Since the
death of Joseph Stalin, military strength in
the governmental process has increased,
and officers now enjoy greater freedom from
political control. Further, there has also
been a significant revision of military doc-
trine. The new developments in weapons
technology have been integrated into Soviet
strategic thought, but Garthoff thinks that
the strategic concept continues to be
&dquo;founded on the belief that the primary ob-
ject of military operations is the destruction
of hostile military forces, and not the an-
nihilation of the economic and population
resources of the enemy&dquo; (p. 71). The Soviet
elite has not chosen to place primary em-
phasis on strategic bombing, nor has the air
force been made the dominant arm (as an
illustration, no air-force officer can attain
the highest military rank [p. 54]). Garthoff
believes that, even though the Soviet Union
has become doctrinally and otherwise pre-
pared for general nuclear war, it is not
committed to this form of warfare. It has
maintained a broadly diversified capability.
Although there appears to have been no ex-
plicit discussion advocating limited war in
the Soviet Union, the U.S.S.R. has engaged
in such contests in the past and is capable
of doing so in the future. GarthoS thinks
that it is &dquo;improbable&dquo; that the U.S.S.R.
&dquo;would initiate the use of nuclear weapons
in a local war&dquo; (p. 115), but, if the West
introduced these weapons, the Soviets would
most likely reply in kind. In such a situa-
tion he feels that, despite pronouncements
to the contrary, the Soviet Union might well
agree in practice to limitations on the tacti-
cal use of nuclear weapons (pp. llOff.).
The author’s main theme is that the Soviet
Union’s military preparation will allow it
flexibility in strategic decision so that in any
contingency it can &dquo;select the most advan-
tageous and least costly of alternatives&dquo; (p.
249).
War and the Soviet Union concentrates
more narrowly on the evolution of high-level
political-military strategic doctrine. One of
Mr. Dinerstein’s main theses is that &dquo;readi-
ness to strike a pre-emptive blow became,
early in 1955, a principal aim of official
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Soviet policy&dquo; (p. 188). A &dquo;pre-emptive&dquo;
blow is defined as a strike designed to fore-
stall an imminent enemy attack. Dinerstein
thinks that Soviet leaders, in considering
the implications of nuclear weapons, have
radically revised their estimate of the sig-
nificance of surprise attack and that they
now feel that, for the U.S.S.R. to be secure,
it must be able to pre-empt the enemy’s
ability to strike first if he appears about to
do so. The author also maintains that &dquo;Soviet
leaders now believe that the world military
balance of power has changed decisively in
their favor&dquo; (p. 1). He attempts throughout
his book to correlate developments in the
West and in the struggle for power among
the U.S.S.R.’s elite with the evolution of
Soviet strategic doctrine.
The last book, Bernard Brodie’s Strategy
in the Nuclear Age, is the most recent and
in many ways also the most comprehensive
exposition of the strategic implications of
the revolutionary developments in military
technology. Mr. Brodie’s long work in the
field of military affairs is evident in the first
section, a description and analysis of the
evolution of strategic thought with particu-
lar emphasis on the ideas of Guilo Douhet,
the foremost exponent of air power. As air-
power theories have been so important in
shaping American military doctrine, the
background this section provides is especial-
ly helpful. In the second section, Brodie
considers the problems the advent of nu-
clear weapons and missiles pose for the
United States. The problems of defense, de-
terrence, and limited war, as well as the
economic implications of security policy, are
explored in detail in this section. The au-
thor’s policy recommendations include urg-
ing greater efforts to protect our strategic
retaliatory force (as the United States has
renounced preventive war, it must have a
second-strike capability) and population and
greater efforts to achieve a more diversified
military establishment with increased lim-
ited war capabilities. He feels that it is im-
portant to stress that limited wars must be
fought with severe restraints on the means
employed and that objectives are indeed
limited but primarily because unrestricted
war with modern weapons would be intol-
erable (pp. 312 ff. ) . The book is marked by
a sense of political realism and a sensitivity
to the profound moral issues involved.
III
The limits of our knowledge in the field
of security policy are great. Predictions
about the future course of war have always
been hazardous and have often proved woe-
fully wrong. They are even more hazardous
today when it is necessary to take into
account the as yet only partially revealed
revolution in military technology. The se-
cretiveness of the Soviet regime is a further
complication.
We actually know very little about the
new weapons, yet such knowledge is vitally
necessary for any number of crucial deci-
sions ; for instance, whether or not we favor
the use of nuclear weapons in tactical sit-
uations. Kissinger argues for the tactical use
of nuclear weapons, claiming that they
would favor the technologically superior
West and that, if mobile, self-contained
units utilized such weapons with appro-
priate tactics, it would not involve intolera-
ble destruction (pp. 174 ff. ) . Present United
States policy seems to be based on these
conclusions. Brodie, on the other hand, ques-
tions whether using nuclear weapons in
tactical situations would be to the West’s
advantage and doubts that massive destruc-
tion could be avoided (pp. 319 ff. ) . He
wonders whether insistence on using nuclear
weapons may not deter some states from
requesting American assistance in the event
of an attack or weaken the United States
resolve to intervene. Partly, the question of
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the use of nuclear weapons in tactical sit-
uations depends upon assumptions about
human conduct-would American and Soviet
elites during war agree to distinguish be-
tween types of nuclear weapons and to
limitations on their use? Convincing evi-
dence unfortunately can be presented on
both sides. But the issue also hinges on
knowledge of the effects of nuclear weap-
ons. One wishes some of the books under
consideration contained more data in this
area (Brodie’s study presents the greatest
amount of technical information). Security
restrictions, however necessary, have no
doubt been partially responsible for the
failure to describe in detail the character-
istics of new weapons; authors are forbid-
den to reveal some things and probably do
not reveal all that they could because of the
inhibitions these restrictions create. More
data clearly need to be made available. The
Joint Committee on Atomic Energy is to be
applauded for its recent efforts in this di-
rection.2 It is to be hoped that they will
continue. But greater use also needs to be
made of the available data.3
Nor is weapons technology the only area
of ignorance and uncertainty. Dinerstein’s
thesis that the Soviet Union has adopted a
pre-emptive strike policy, if true, would
have profound implications. Yet our ability
to test this conclusion is extremely limited.
Dinerstein’s most conclusive evidence comes
from an article by Marshal of the Tank
Troops P. A. Rotmistrov in the Soviet pe-
riodical Military Thought (Voennaia mysl’)
-an authoritative, limited-circulation Gen-
eral Staff organ. Giving this article such
great emphasis involves the assumption,
which Dinerstein makes (p. 189), that it
necessarily represents official policy. United
States military officers have also argued that
the capability to strike pre-emptive blows
is necessary. Admittedly, the degree of cen-
tral direction differs in the United States
and the Soviet Union, but how much can
be assumed in each case? The problem is
further complicated as few if any scholars
outside government have access to Military
Thought, and the one other author who
does, Garthoff, reaches different conclusions
(pp. 84 ff. ) . This is but one of several dif-
ferences between the two writers. For ex-
ample, Garthoff thinks that the Soviet elite
regards the ballistic missile as &dquo;the logical
and best weapons system for the mission of
deterrence&dquo; (p. 231), while Dinerstein
thinks that Russian leaders &dquo;value the de-
terrent power of the ICBM, but consider it
mainly a weapon of surprise&dquo; (p. 229). This
writer tends to accept Garthoff’s conclu-
sions ; they seem more balanced, but they
are also more comfortable for the United
States. In reality, Soviet intentions are ex-
tremely obscure to us. The limits of our
knowledge about Soviet capabilities should
also be emphasized. The current discussion
of the &dquo;missile gap&dquo; appears to be based
mainly on extrapolations of the U.S.S.R.’s
estimated capacity for production.
In view of the vast areas of ignorance in
the field of security policy, criticisms of past
events and recommendations for future
courses of action should be extremely cau-
tious. There are, it is true, great pressures
in the opposite direction. The policy ques-
tions which have been and are to be de-
2 See particularly Biological and Environ-
mental Effects of Nuclear War (Washington,
D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1959).
3 The best general description of nuclear
weapons is The Effects of Nuclear Weapons,
edited by Samuel Glasstone, prepared by the
Armed Forces Special Weapons Project, and
published by the Atomic Energy Commission
(Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Of-
fice, June, 1957). Mr. Brodie makes frequent
use of this. Although it was not available when
several of the other studies were prepared, an
earlier version published in 1950 was, and
there were numerous other public sources.
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cided are of vital importance, bound to gen-
erate heat and emotion. In the policy de-
bate, recommendations not forcefully stated
risk being overlooked. The very absence of
information creates pressures to publish as
quickly as possible. Still, it does not seem
completely accurate to say, as Osgood does,
that Franklin D. Roosevelt’s strategy in
World War II was that of &dquo;pursuing victory
in a political vacuum&dquo; (p. 116). The his-
torical realities were somewhat more com-
plex, as Osgood himself indicates. Nor does
this writer completely agree with Kissinger’s
estimate of the effects of the development
of a doctrine of limited war. While such a
doctrine might have been useful, as Kissinger
claims, during the Czechoslovakian coup,
the Korean War, and the Indochinese and
Hungarian crises (if, indeed, we did not
have one), it could not have provided a
clear guide for action; there were also im-
portant value questions at stake in each of
these issues. Admittedly, there is a close re-
lationship between doctrinal development
and value choices-the risks you are willing
to take depend partially on your assessment
of what they are and of the possible gains.
But value choices were independent ele-
ments in each case and will be so in similar
instances in the future; they should not be
overlooked by emphasis on doctrine. The
price Americans are willing to pay for cer-
tain anticipated benefits is rightly or wrong-
ly probably fixed within relatively narrow
limits, at least in the short range.
These, however, are minor criticisms. The
books reviewed all contribute significantly
to the fund of available information and
analysis. One of the striking features of
these works is the uniformity of their policy
recommendations. All urge the development
of greater protection for our strategic re-
taliatory forces and increased limited-war
capabilities. It would be useful if some fu-
ture research would explore the practical
implications of these recommendations, par-
ticularly the latter, as the action needed to
implement the former is relatively clear.
The places where limited war is likely are
fairly few: Korea, the Taiwan Strait, South-
east Asia, and certain areas of the Near and
Middle East. Imaginative studies of how
limited war could be conducted in these
locations would usefully supplement the
theory, which is now well established.
Another fruitful area for future research
concerns the reciprocal image each super-
power has of the others’ security policy.
There is no analytical attempt to establish
correlations between American strategy and
detailed developments in Soviet policy.
Dinerstein provides some information on the
opposite situation in his analysis of the So-
viet response to John Foster Dulles’ &dquo;mas-
sive retaliation&dquo; speech (pp. 105ff.), and
Garthoff describes the Soviet military elite’s
image of the United States military estab-
lishment and plans (chap. vi). Significantly,
he has detected no awareness of the West-
ern objective of deterrence (p. 132). But
more work in this area might enhance our
ability rationally to determine future policy.
Estimates must be made about Soviet reac-
tions. This can be done on the basis of logi-
cal inference (see Brodie’s excellent discus-
sion of the implications of establishing in-
termediate-range ballistic missile bases in
NATO countries [pp. 342 ff.]), but it would
be better if a greater body of analytical
data were available.4 Still another area
where future research might prove useful is
in the field of disarmament. In the past
there has been a rather wide gap between
4 Thomas C. Schelling has provided a useful
theoretical framework for such work. See his
"Bargaining, Communication, and Limited
War" and "The Strategy of Conflict," Journal
of Conflict Resolution, I, No. 1 (March, 1957),
19-36, and II, No. 3 (September, 1958 ), 203-
64.
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those interested in disarmament and those
interested in security policy; a joining to-
gether might be productive. Even if it were
not, few separations could be as unfortunate.
IV
In view of the uniformity of the recom-
mendations advanced in these studies, the
fact that they have apparently had so little
impact on United States security policy is
surprising. In the years since the first of
these books appeared, our limited-war ca-
pability appears to have declined, and little
visibly has been done to protect our strategic
retaliatory force. Despite the universal crit-
icism of the &dquo;massive retaliation&dquo; policy,
United States military forces remain struc-
tured in this mold.
Perhaps the problems have been over-
simplified, or perhaps more concrete recom-
mendations are needed. It may be that
scholars in this field, like divisional com-
manders, have been overly concerned with
their own sectors. In the real world security
needs must be balanced against others. The
chief rationale Dulles offered for the &dquo;mas-
sive retaliation&dquo; policy was after all an eco-
nomic one. In light of this it is regrettable
that only Brodie analyzes the economic
problems in detail (chap. x). Probably the
most important factor, however, is public
apathy. But this too must be explained. Is
it as Philip Wylie suggested in an essay
reprinted in the Furniss volume that Amer-
icans are psychologically incapable of facing
the dangers of the nuclear age, or is Osgood
correct in arguing that Americans would
respond adequately if there were proper
leadership?
Whatever explanation one chooses, it is
clear that the massive-retaliation posture is
probably more congenial to the traditional
American attitude of &dquo;going it alone&dquo; than
the recommended alternatives. With this
traditional attitude, it is probably more re-
markable that the United States has taken
the military action it has in the years since
the second World War than that it has not
done more. And the contrast of our present
military capabilities with those of 1939 is
certainly greater than with the recom-
mended alternatives. The transition in two
decades has been astounding. The new
academic interest in security policy is a part
of this, and, even acknowledging the current
gap between recommendation and policy,
scholarship has played an important role
in the transition. Whether this transition
has gone far enough with sumcient speed,
only history will determine. Meanwhile the
more scholarship in this area the better. It
cannot help but stimulate at least some ac-
tion, and, the more information and analysis
available, the greater our ability to act ra-
tionally in this field of rapid change and
great danger.
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